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Peter Scott and James T. Walker 
 
 
Bringing Entertainment into America’s homes: Marketing Radios 
in an Era of Rapid Technological Change 
 
 
Abstract: We examine the early marketing and distribution of entertainment 
radio sets. Manufacturers used distribution networks to both maximise profits 
and create barriers to entry. Lacking the market power of auto manufacturers, 
they developed cooperative strategies with authorised distributors and 
dealers. Dealers often complained about the costly activities manufacturers 
required of them. However, these underpinned the dominant quality and 
branding competition model of the 1920s, while the Depression era switch to 
a simpler radio format, sold on price, proved catastrophic for the specialist 
retailer. 
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Together with the automobile, entertainment radio was the key transformative 
communications technology of the 1920s.  Radio broadcasting had wide-reaching impacts: 
unifying an ethnically and culturally diverse nation, reducing the isolation of rural and small-
town America, introducing regional music styles to a national audience, and bringing a new, 
intrusive, and inescapable form of advertising into people’s homes. Radio even had a major 
impact in reducing linguistic diversity, establishing ‘broadcast English’ as the new national 
popular norm.i Even compared to earlier communications technologies - the telegraph, 
railroad, and telephone - its impact was dramatic; both in terms of the broad range of 
information and entertainment it instantly conveyed and its extremely rapid diffusion.ii 
To meet the explosive demand for radio, manufacturers required effective 
downstream distribution systems. Existing high-ticket consumer goods offered a variety of 
models. Singer marketed their sewing machines principally through their own retail outlets.iii 
Meanwhile auto producers assumed considerable control over franchised dealership 
networks. Radio appeared to have stronger parallels with three novel labour-saving 
appliances being introduced to American homes via aggressive salesmanship - vacuum 
cleaners, washing machines, and refrigerators. These were characterised by high prices, a 
consequent reliance of time-payment plans, and inter-firm competition based on intensive 
promotion, branding, and quality, rather than price.  
In contrast to these ‘white goods’, which faced very strong initial consumer resistance 
and inertia, necessitating ‘push selling’ by door-to-door salesmen trained and supervised by 
the manufacturer, radio instantly found a ready market. Yet set-makers faced greater business 
risks than white goods producers, owing to the lack of strong technical economies of scale in 
production, the consequent ease of entry to the sector, and rapid and unpredictable technical 
obsolescence. They thus sought to market their products co-operatively with independent 
distributors (wholesalers) and dealers (retailers), who were incentivised to conform to their 
marketing policy and promote their brand over competitors. 
 Dealers increasingly perceived that the level, and mix, of marketing activities 
advocated by manufacturers was not optimal from their perspective. Door-to-door canvassing 
presented a particular grievance. Many retailers found that this acted to boost sales, but not 
profits, while incurring significant managerial problems in monitoring and motivating 
salesmen. Our analysis confirms dealers’ perceptions that, by the late 1920s, door-to-door 
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sales were of much greater benefit to the manufacturer than the dealer. However, this 
nevertheless provided dealers with some measure of protection from competition. During the 
depression manufacturers’ control over distribution networks broke down and dealers 
(desperate to survive in a market overloaded with surplus stock at distress prices), embraced a 
new, radically cheaper, radio set format, the midget, produced by firms outside the 
mainstream industry. By doing so they undermined their key differentiating advantages 
compared to general retailers and precipitated the rapid decline of the specialist radio dealer. 
 
Manufacturers’ promotional and distribution strategies 
The launch of entertainment radio at the start of the 1920s was followed by a boom in 
equipment sales, unprecedented for any high-ticket household durable. The proportion of 
American homes with radios rose from less than 1 per cent in 1922 to 16.0 per cent in 1926, 
45.8 per cent in 1930 and 67.3 per cent in 1935 - by which time a significant number owned 
more than one set.iv Fears that the growth of broadcasting would not keep pace with radio set 
demand proved unfounded. During 1922 alone the number of licensed stations rose from 28 
to 570.v These were established by a variety of organizations, including newspapers, 
educational institutions, retailers, and municipalities. Start-up costs were low, as stations 
generally broadcast over relatively short distances and used either amateur performers or 
professionals who could be persuaded to appear for free.vi  
Radio equipment manufacturers and dealers played a key pioneering role in 
broadcasting, representing the largest single category of station owner by 1923.vii Some also 
took the lead in developing regular national programming. In December 1923 the National 
Carbon Company launched what became the Eveready Hour to promote its radio batteries, 
integrating music, drama, and talk into a single programme. Eveready set a precedent for 
other major radio equipment manufacturers in sponsoring regularly scheduled programmes.viii 
In October 1925 the leading set manufacturer Atwater Kent launched the ‘Atwater Kent 
Hour’, which rapidly became the most popular U.S. radio programme, featuring top 
musicians and costing the firm $7,000 per week by the 1926-27 season.ix In April 1928 RCA 
launched the ‘RCA Demonstration Hour’, breaking the tradition of prime programming being 
restricted to the evenings. Broadcast each Saturday at 2.30 EST, it enabled retailers to 
demonstrate a quality music programme.x RCA also played a leading role in the development 
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of national networked broadcasting, culminating in the launch of its National Broadcasting 
Company (NBC) network in the fall of 1926. 
Radio ownership greatly outpaced the diffusion of other appliances such as vacuum 
cleaners, refrigerators, and washing machines, reflecting radio’s role as a ‘counter-status 
luxury’, with utility varying inversely with income (as higher income groups have more 
substitutes for its entertainment services).xi Rapid diffusion occurred despite radios being 
initially very expensive and often requiring costly external antennae, plus frequent servicing. 
Demand was initially dominated by classic `early adopters’ – radio enthusiasts and home-
constructors, who were more interested in the technical challenges of radio than in what was 
being broadcast. Homemade sets out-numbered factory-made receiver sales until 1925, while 
early listeners’ first priority was often distance of reception.xii 
However, by the mid-1920s mainstream users, who were chiefly interested in 
programme content, began to dominate the market. The advent of national programming also 
contributed to a decline in the importance listeners placed on distance, relative to 
characteristics such as tone, selectivity between stations, simplicity of operation, and 
appearance.xiii Complete sets displaced kits, increasing the importance of branding and 
effective distribution systems. These required efficient sales organizations to promote this 
new product locally, provide after-sales service, and arrange instalment credit for what was 
initially a very high-ticket durable. 
 Value chains are useful devices for analysing the coordinating mechanisms governing 
the design, production, and marketing of consumer durables. They identify both the key 
players involved in organizing the sequence of activities that brings the good to the consumer 
in a particular format, quality, and price and the ways in which their actions impact on the 
nature of competition and the distribution of profits at each stage of the production and 
distribution process. The value chain literature identifies two typical governance forms – 
producer-driven chains – coordinated by key manufacturers (typically those commanding 
strategic technologies), and buyer-driven chains - coordinated by firms responsible for final 
distribution. Buyer-driven chains tend to be more common in labour-intensive industries, 
while consumer durables involving new technologies are generally dominated by producer-
driven chains.xiv 
In producer-driven chains key manufacturers typically take responsibility for co-
ordinating both suppliers and distributors.xv This enables them to dominate marketing and to 
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capture a disproportionate share of profits via their control over branding and design. 
However, each stage of the value chain is likely to benefit from participation (compared to 
un-coordinated market competition), as by coordinating marketing and distribution the lead 
firm can both add value to these stages and impose some barrier against new entrants. 
Much research on producer-driven value chains for new consumer durables during 
this period has focused on the automobile sector, where, as Richard Tedlow noted, 
manufacturer-dealer relations were ‘marked by often bitter conflict.’xvi Leading auto 
producers used their considerable market power over dealers to impose franchise contracts, 
which could be cancelled with little if any notice and without which continued activity in the 
sector was often not possible. This in turn assisted them in pressuring dealers into both 
accepting close monitoring and coordination of their activities and in taking on various costs, 
which they would otherwise have borne directly.xvii Examples include shipping unwanted 
stock (in excess to dealers’ requirements, sent at the end of the production year for that 
model, or packed with accessories) and pressure to use manufacturers’ retail finance 
facilities.xviii 
While autos was a highly oligopolistic sector dominated by three players, radio 
developed much greater competition in all price ranges.  Radio Corporation of America 
(RCA), initially looked set to dominate, obtaining what was believed to be a radio patent 
monopoly, under a U.S. Navy-sponsored initiative to unify American radio patents in a single 
domestically-owned concern. RCA initially marketed radios produced by the two main firms 
that pooled their patents for its formation - General Electric and Westinghouse. Yet a failure 
to successfully coordinate production, together with some loopholes in the exclusivity of key 
patents it controlled, resulted in RCA gaining less than a quarter of the receiver market during 
1922-27. Meanwhile anti-trust threats and political pressure increasingly tempered the power 
of its patents as an entry barrier.xix However, its technical leadership and strong position in 
the tube and components markets enabled RCA to retain its status as the largest radio 
equipment producer and leading set manufacturer by value. 
 Radio manufacture became a relatively fragmented industry compared to autos (or 
high ticket labour-saving durables such as refrigerators, vacuum cleaners, and sewing 
machines); as late as 1940 the largest receiver manufacturer accounted for only 14.4 per cent 
of sales and the largest three controlled just 37.4 per cent of the market.xx Vigorous 
competition between dozens of significant manufacturers, together with rapid technical 
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obsolescence in this dynamic sector, gave rise to a near-universal strategy of annual model 
changes.xxi Moreover, demand for new models proved highly unpredictable, owing to the 
speed of innovation and the intensity of competition.xxii These conditions had important 
implications for distribution networks, on account of both the weaker market power of 
individual manufacturers and the impracticality of manufacturers looking to dealers to hold 
their inventory over the slack season.xxiii 
Demand for radios, like that for cars, was highly seasonal.xxiv In autos General Motors 
(GM) successfully pioneered a strategy of building up massive inventories in their winter 
slack season, underpinned by a distribution strategy whereby their dealers carried the stocks.  
Franchised dealers were required to hold GM inventory on their premises, the retailer’s costs 
in turn being covered by (often manufacturer-owned or associated) finance companies, who 
carried their inventory loans and purchased their retail instalment sales contracts.xxv However, 
given the unpredictability of demand for radios, this strategy proved impractical. Meanwhile 
radio’s fragmented industrial structure prevented control via GM’s system of franchise 
contracts subject to termination without notice, as dealers could turn to other brands.  
Manufacturers responded to the high uncertainty of demand for new models and 
strong demand seasonality by using labour-intensive production systems, which were flexible 
with regard to the scale of production, but did not offer substantial scale economies. 
Meanwhile economies of scope were obviated by many components being externally sourced 
from specialist firms.xxvi 
 
Co-ordinating distribution 
 
Major radio manufacturers typically organized distribution via independent 
wholesalers, who were given exclusive territories and in turn served independent dealers. 
However, through co-operative and co-ordinated advertising; dealer educational activities; 
and a variety of other assistance with marketing and credit provision, manufacturers sought to 
develop strong relationships with retailers. In return, dealers were expected to follow their 
marketing policy and prioritise their brand over the others they stocked for activities such as 
door-to-door canvassing, window displays, or customer recommendation. This addressed a 
classic problem regarding distribution via independent dealers – if the dealer bore all the 
7 
 
costs of their own promotional activities they would engage in less promotion expenditure 
than the manufacturer (who shared in the benefits) found optimal.xxvii  
David Sarnoff of RCA devoted considerable time during 1922 and 1923 to telling 
jobbers and retailers in the electrical goods and musical instrument trades how radio was to 
be marketed - addressing their conventions or writing in their journals. His proposed 
distribution model proved remarkably prescient, foreshadowing most major developments 
during the 1920s. Sarnoff emphasised that the enthusiast home-constructor era was temporary 
and that radio would soon be sold as an entertainment durable and a piece of furniture: ‘a 
device which has a very important bearing on our home life, for its sphere is one of culture, 
education and entertainment… somewhat of the characteristics of the phonograph and other 
musical instruments… not a mere electrical utility…’ To achieve this, retailers should 
provide: 
an attractive store to fit in harmoniously with the accustomed methods of selling 
musical instruments… the adoption of intensive selling practices, such as special 
demonstrations, demonstrations in the home, a reasonable amount of local 
advertising, and inauguration of all those special methods, which have been found 
valuable in other business in carrying on intensive selling campaigns.xxviii 
Sarnoff urged dealers to make their stores attractive to women (whom, he said, 
accounted for 80 per cent of phonograph sales) and employ staff who could sell on the basis 
of appearance, simplicity of operation, and value for money. This might involve window 
displays showing the radio taking pride of place in the living room; separate salesmen to deal 
with radio hams and mainstream customers; and crews of ‘outside’ salesmen, who would 
arrange home trials through door-to-door canvassing, to break down sales resistance and 
inertia (including fears that radios would be too complicated to operate).xxix He also 
emphasised the need for time payment schemes to increase affordability.xxx 
By the mid-1920s retailers were beginning to note this transition towards a new type 
of customer and, as Sarnoff had predicted, the need for retail practices that met (increasingly) 
her needs. Dealers characterised women as being more demanding customers than men - 
expecting a radio set to be reliable, easy to operate, and attractive in appearance. They were 
also said to purchase only after undertaking comparison shopping; ‘for a woman largely sells 
the merchandise she buys to herself’.xxxi  One dealer proposed employing some female indoor 
sales staff – building on the precedent of music retailing.xxxii Yet subsequent trade press 
8 
 
discussions generally assumed the national sales force to be uniformly male, a result 
corroborated by a 1930 U.S. Department of Commerce radio dealer survey.xxxiii The absence 
(or invisibility) of women sales staff may reflect popular assumptions that technical 
competence in radio was a masculine characteristic, or the need for salesmen, on occasion, to 
deliver bulky console sets to households. However, during the 1920s men dominated most 
areas of direct sales (especially door-to-door), including sectors such as brushes, where 
women were the principal customers.xxxiv 
Most major manufacturers, including RCA, Crosley, Zenith, and Atwater Kent, 
adopted a distribution policy based on assigning territories to appointed wholesale 
distributors, who in turn supplied only authorised dealers (who nevertheless typically also 
sold other radio brands).xxxv Some, including RCA, assigned sales quotas to each 
wholesaler.xxxvi A minority operated their own wholesale branches, while large retail 
customers such as mail-order houses, chain stores, and department stores, often placed their 
orders directly with the manufacturer.xxxvii By limiting local competition, authorised 
dealerships constituted a ‘carrot’ to encourage dealers’ conformance with the manufacturer’s 
retail model. For example RCA, which moved to authorised dealerships in 1926, had the 
following requirements: a well-located store, with a well-appointed showroom, including 
sound booths; the use of window displays to promote their product; an ‘energetic’ sales 
organization; adequate servicing facilities; and ‘An advertising policy which is as liberal as 
the dealer’s circumstances will permit’.xxxviii 
Authorised distributors were rewarded with discounts from list prices that grew 
significantly over the 1920s. In August 1922 RCA offered dealers 25% discounts for orders 
up to $499 and 33.3% for larger orders, while their wholesales received a 46% discount 
(broadly in line with a December 1922 estimate for the sector as a whole).xxxix Discounts 
subsequently rose - by February 1928 RCA dealers and wholesalers received discounts of 40 
and 52.5% respectively.xl They still had to be persuaded to hold significant stocks, given that 
market conditions often led to reductions in list prices, which devalued their inventory. RCA 
addressed this via a price protection policy.  In the event of list price reductions, distributors 
and dealers were refunded the difference between the old and new price on each unsold set.xli 
Zenith achieved the same goal via a policy of no price reductions (underpinned by a 
conservative production strategy, relative to distributors’ orders) to avoid dealers having to 
worry about suddenly finding their sets, 'worth fifty cents to the dollar.’xlii 
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Maintaining capacity production was problematic in industries subject to strong 
seasonality and annual model changes – factors which had led GM to experiment with 
demand forecasting and, from the middle of 1924, to require statistical reports from dealers at 
10-day intervals.xliii Zenith’s spectacular success from the mid-1920s was attributed to their 
introduction of a production and inventory planning system, based on distributors’ purchase 
commitments - updated quarterly. By facilitating price stability, the system was also said to 
have built loyalty among distributors and dealers.xliv  
RCA Victor (the radio division formed after the merger with Victor Talking Machine 
Co.) introduced a production control plan from the fall of 1930. Distributors were required to 
secure sales reports from each of their dealers and collate them into weekly reports for 
RCA.xlv By summer 1931 distributors were also required to provide estimates of their 
requirements, to reduce the interval between RCA’s materials purchase and use to 60 days 
(compared with 120-180 days in 1929).xlvi However, problems of coordinating production 
and sales persisted throughout the 1930s.xlvii In addition to production, or market volatility, 
problems, an RCA review identified cases where they had over-sold dealers on likely sales, 
or where some smaller distributors had responded to RCA’s ‘pressure selling’ by accepting 
larger stocks than they could move.xlviii  
An extensive volume of information also flowed downstream from manufacturers to 
distributors and dealers, via bulletins, national and regional sales conventions, and in-house 
journals. For example Crosley was producing the Crosley Radio Weekly by January 1924, 
later replaced by the Crosley Broadcaster. In addition to informing distributors and dealers 
about their general activities, these included information on marketing assistance; letters from 
dealers (generally supporting the company’s marketing policy); and articles extolling the 
merits of activities such as direct selling.xlix 
Supporting dealers was seen as essential to developing strong relationships that would 
foster loyalty to their brand and retail policy. This was achieved through extensive 
expenditures on co-operative and co-ordinated advertising and ‘sales’ helps’ (point of sale 
advertising material) a strategy also intensively exploited by refrigerator manufacturers.l  
Cooperative advertising appears to have become popular towards the end of the 1920s, as 
shown by advertising spend data for RCA, in Table 1.  This included a plan under which 
RCA paid half the costs of dealers’ direct mailings featuring their products.li Crosley had 
initiated support for direct mailing by the start of the 1928/29 season, dealers being offered a 
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set of three mailings for each potential customer, delivered to the dealer stamped and 
addressed for 15c, for use in conjunction with a door-to-door sales campaign.lii 
[Table 1 near here] 
RCA’s co-operative advertising appears to have grown considerably over the 
depression. By the fall of 1931 RCA Victor operated a system whereby they and the local 
distributor each paid 25 per cent of a dealer’s print advertising costs, providing certain 
conditions were met (including at least 50 per cent of total advertising space being used to 
illustrate RCA merchandise and the RCA Victor name featuring at least as large as that of the 
store).liii For major accounts, such as chain stores, RCA offered to meet 50 per cent of 
advertising costs, for expenditures up to 5% of the chain’s purchases.liv 
Manufacturers also engaged in extensive advertising support activities for dealers, 
including ‘ready-made’ newspaper ads on which stores could add their own details. Other 
aids included billboard posters; window display material; store interior displays; electric 
signs, and advertising novelties.lv Some also provided sales training. By 1925 De Forest’s 
sales department was running a radio salesmanship and service correspondence course, which 
around 800 dealers had completed, involving a combination of home study and discussion 
meetings among relevant staff in each store.lvi 
Manufacturers also sought to coordinate their own customer advertising with their 
dealers. As Table 1 shows, direct space advertising over 1923-29 was equivalent to around 
5.3 per cent of RCA’s sales revenue and accounted for two thirds of its advertising 
expenditure. By 1927 RCA was supplementing its national magazine advertising with 
newspaper advertising in major cities, while urging its distributors to encourage dealers to 
arrange tie-in promotions, such as set demonstrations.lvii  
 
The radio dealer 
In 1926, when the launch of NBC inaugurated national network broadcasting, an 
estimated 31,000 radio retailers and 1,000 wholesalers sold the output of some 2,000 
manufacturers to a national radio audience of around 20,000,000, owning 5,000,000 
receivers.lviii  Yet despite the rapid growth of equipment sales, the retail sector demonstrated 
significant dealer mortality. The National Electrical Manufacturers Association sponsored a 
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Department of Commerce survey of dealers (defined as any retailer who carried an average 
stock of $500 or more in radio merchandise), covering the three quarters from October 1st 
1927. Of over 31,000 dealers identified in each quarter, more than 1,000 had gone out of 
business by the next quarter – suggesting an annual failure rate of about 13 per cent.lix 
Dealers were required to carry significant stocks of expensive, rapidly depreciating, 
equipment. A 1930 national survey found that retailers typically stocked around five different 
brands of radio and that stocking an excessive range contributed to failures, by accentuating 
obsolescence risks.lx Given that in 1933 the largest nine radio set manufacturers were said to 
account for 74 per cent of industry turnover, a typical store would thus stock around half the 
leading brands.lxi 
Problems of depreciating stocks were accentuated by strong demand seasonality. The 
1930 survey found that 39 per cent of business was conducted over the October-December 
quarter, compared to only 16 and 17 per cent respectively for the April-June and July-
September quarters. A number of dealers turned to supplementary lines, principally electrical 
appliances, to reduce seasonal fluctuations.lxii Dealers also faced problems with trade-ins, 
estimated to feature in at least 40 per cent of radio sales by the late 1920s. These both 
lowered margins and gave the retailer the dilemma of either selling used radios in 
competition with new stock or disposing of them either at a total loss, or at a price making 
only a small contribution to the trade-in allowance.lxiii Yet they also enabled dealers to engage 
in price competition, without opening flouting manufacturers’ list prices. 
Business risks were further accentuated by credit sales. Radios were relatively 
expensive household durables in the 1920s. As Table 2 shows, the average 1924 unit price of 
a home radio was around $67.00, plus the cost of four or five tubes (sold separately, at around 
three dollars each), batteries, and other accessories.lxiv As radios became grander and more 
complex, prices rose further, peaking at $133 in 1929 (again, net of tubes). Not surprisingly, 
credit facilities rapidly became integral to retail success. 
In 1928 RCA reported estimates that approximately 70 per cent of radios were sold on 
deferred payments; while an estimate for 1930 put the figure at 75 per cent; on a par with 
other high-ticket consumer durables.lxv Of 33 dealers surveyed by the Department of 
Commerce in 1930, only one conducted business on a cash-only basis, while the rest made an 
average of 80 per cent of radio sales on credit. Most financed deferred payments using their 
own funds or bank loans; only 21 per cent relied exclusively on a finance company. The most 
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common terms involved a 10 per cent down-payment with the balance payable monthly over 
10-12 months, typically at 6 per cent annual interest.lxvi 
[Table 2 near here] 
Several manufacturers arranged credit plans for their dealers. By September 1928 
RCA was advertising a plan run by Commercial Investment Trust, which provided dealers 
with an immediate advance of 90 per cent of the un-matured face value of their paper, less a 
discount charge. The remaining 10 per cent was then deducted from the final payment on the 
contract. Under this scheme the only cost to the dealer was the service charge, which could be 
passed on to the purchaser by adding 0.5 per cent per month to the cash price.lxvii Unlike in 
autos, where dealers claimed to be coerced into using finance companies tied to 
manufacturers, even facilities promoted by the set-makers typically involved independent 
finance companies. lxviii  This reflected the weaker market power of individual manufacturers 
in radio and the impracticality of dealers holding large inventories, given highly 
unpredictable obsolescence. However, the absence of manufacturer-tied credit removed a 
potential source of cyclical demand stabilisation. One justification for tied finance in autos 
was that it would be maintained during hard times, when independent finance companies 
might tighten provision.lxix Indeed, during the depression the availability of radio commercial 
time-payment paper tapered off, becoming practically non-existent by 1932 according to 
Radio Retailing. Dealers were thus forced to finance credit directly, which gave better-
capitalised firms a competitive edge. It was not until the mid-1930s that finance companies 
again began to show interest in this sector.lxx 
Taking radio to the prospect’s home 
Canvassing was already a proven sales method for phonographs and was quickly 
adopted by the radio trade.lxxi By the mid-1920s it had become common for dealers to engage 
in door-to-door selling, typically offering to set up a radio in the home and leave it for several 
days on trial. This was a relatively novel innovation, though it had been employed by Eureka 
Vacuum Cleaner Co. from 1912 and was widely used by refrigerator manufacturers during 
the 1920s.lxxii  Home demonstrations had a number of important attractions for radio – 
allaying fears that operation might prove too complex, or that reception would be too weak, 
and introducing the family to broadcast entertainment over several days.lxxiii Buyers often 
perceived home demonstrations as a good way of testing a set’s performance, though from 
the dealer’s perspective it was seen primarily, ‘as a lever to accelerate the normal process of 
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the realization of the need… - to stimulate desire.’lxxiv It also avoided price comparison with 
cheaper models, boosting the sale of large console sets. 
[Figure 1 near here] 
A 1925 Radio Merchandising survey found that 38 per cent of radio dealers in the 
USA and Canada used door-to-door canvassing.lxxv J.J. Moore, the Radio Dept. manager of 
New Orleans department store Maison Blanche, stated in 1925 that the most important factor 
in radio sales was home demonstration, followed by price and service.lxxvi In 1929 Radio 
Retailing estimated that most radio dealers employed at least two outside salesmen full-time, 
with more recruited for special campaigns. Paying a straight commission of 15 per cent or 
less (with salesmen covering their own expenses) was considered most satisfactory.lxxvii 
Radio manufacturers vigorously promoted door-to-door selling.  For example, in 
February 1929 Crosley Broadcaster informed dealers that, ‘During 1928 the sale of Crosley 
sets was built up to record-breaking proportions by means of home demonstration.’lxxviii Yet 
radio trade journals were receiving a growing correspondence from dealers arguing that direct 
sales were of limited, if any, attraction for them. Retailers found direct selling difficult to 
manage, expensive, and – given the rapidly growing proportion of replacement sales - a high 
cost means of fighting for people already in the market, rather than creating a new market. 
Moreover, the minimum efficient scale for direct selling- a team of four or five salesmen 
working collectively from a single vehicle –required a much larger territory for year-round 
employment than the catchment areas of most stores. The main exceptions were large traders 
such as department stores, though these were said to follow conservative selling policies, 
often eschewing outdoor canvassing.lxxix Personnel problems represented another key 
obstacle; a 1930 survey noted that, ‘many store managers have found it impossible to secure 
men who are intelligent and sufficiently aggressive... More than two-thirds… definitely stated 
that the problem of securing the right type of men… was continually bothering them.’ lxxx 
By the late 1920s Victor’s Talking Machine Division was seeking to address these 
problems by establishing direct sales organizations in each wholesaler, put at the disposal of 
successive dealers for short periods of intensive selling. Where circumstances warranted, the 
wholesaler might turn over one or two experienced salesmen to the dealer on a permanent 
basis. It was anticipated that this would boost sales both directly and by encouraging retailers 
to intensify their own direct sales efforts.lxxxi The ‘Victor Resale Plan’ followed the broad 
outlines of established resale plans in other industries, such as vacuum cleaners, with the 
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manufacturer running the direct sales effort and the dealer being responsible for itinerary, 
instalment credit, and paying a 10 per cent commission on sales (which, together with a 
further 2.5 per cent commission from the wholesaler, would fully finance the programme). 
Based on experience in the South, crews of five salesmen were expected to close 30 sales per 
week (10 radiograms and 20 radios). They would be remunerated via a drawing account of 
$30 per week against 5 per cent commission and all expenses.lxxxii Atwater Kent was 
recommending a broadly similar plan by 1929, based on deploying seven salesmen for 
intensive campaigns of three or four weeks, followed by the permanent retention of two or 
three.lxxxiii However, manufacturer-organized direct selling does not appear to have become 
firmly established before the depression curtailed such activity. 
A 1928 Radio Retailing national survey of 109 dealers found that around 40 per cent 
of sales were made through canvassing, with those groups of firms undertaking the highest, 
and lowest, sales being most reliant on canvassers. The survey was pessimistic regarding the 
value of direct sales: ‘outside selling is more costly to the merchant and… its percentage cost 
is not reduced through increased volume to a figure comparable with the cost of inside 
selling.’lxxxiv Scepticism intensified during the depression. As an Albany dealer noted, ‘Too 
often… this makes money for everybody concerned except the dealer.’lxxxv Margins were said 
to be squeezed by opportunistic ‘joy riders’, who obtained a series of sets from various 
dealers on home demonstration with no intention of purchasing. One Atlanta dealer was 
reported to have found that each unsuccessful demonstration cost $15 (when factors such as 
damage to cabinets and tube replacements were included), while only one in three resulted in 
a sale. The resulting costs (including at least $5 for each successful sale) wiped out almost all 
dealer profit.lxxxvi A March 1930 Radio Retailing survey of 1,000 dealers broadly 
corroborated these figures. Each successful, and unsuccessful, home demonstration was 
found to cost $4.51 and $13.43 respectively.lxxxvii  
A Radio Retailing survey of 109 radio retailers allows us to test whether dealers’ 
perceptions regarding the poor cost-effectiveness of intensive canvassing were justified.lxxxviii 
The sample was said to be well balanced geographically and to cover all types of outlet 
dealing in radio.lxxxix The survey year, 1928, was described as the most profitable to date, 
with average net profits having increased by 3.3 per cent of sales compared to their previous 
(1926) survey.  Yet, the survey was surprisingly pessimistic, noting that rising net margins 
were driven by  higher gross margins (boosted by lower stock obsolescence during a year of 
vigorous demand), while costs had actually increased between the two surveys, by 0.8 per 
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cent of net sales. The report singled out rising selling costs as the chief problem. These had 
risen from 9.4 to 12.0 per cent of net sales, while publicity expenses had actually fallen, from 
5.1 to 3.3 per cent (partly owing to rising manufacturers’ co-operative advertising). Rising 
selling costs were, in turn, attributed to increased door-to-door canvassing.xc 
The survey included information on net retail sales; costs of merchandise sold; gross 
profits (sales minus cost of merchandise sold); and expenses – divided into occupancy, 
selling, publicity, administration, servicing, and other costs.xci  To test whether radio 
manufacturers pushed their retailers into unattractively high levels of selling expenditure 
(from the retailer’s perspective), we compare the relative impact of publicity and selling 
expense on retailers’ gross and net profits. Our results, for a cross-section of 100 retailers, are 
shown in Table 3.xcii The estimates are derived using Generalised Least Squares and are 
transformed in log-form to enable the coefficients to be interpreted as marginal effects. Given 
a view among some dealers that door-to-door sales reduced the need for a well-located store, 
we also include occupancy expenses as a control variable in both estimations.   
The table shows that the return on gross profit for selling expenditure was about 40 
per cent higher than that for publicity spend. Conversely, the return on net profit (after 
deducting expenses) on publicity expenditure was more than two and half times as high as 
that for selling - assuming that the coefficient of selling, which is insignificantly different 
from zero, is consistently estimated.  In both cases the results are well determined, being 
significant at the 1% level. Occupancy expenditure similarly shows a markedly greater return 
on net profits than that for selling expense, despite having a lower return on gross profits.xciii 
The analysis thus indicates that direct selling was particularly successful in boosting gross 
profits, thus benefiting the manufacturer and wholesaler, but offered lower returns than 
advertising or better retail premises, once the retailer’s costs are deducted. 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
 
However, while door to door selling may not have advantaged the retailer - compared 
to a situation where all local dealers abstained from canvassing - it does appear to have acted 
as a significant barrier to entry.  Canvassing was a specialist activity, with significant 
minimum costs for dedicated staff and vehicles, which were most efficiently employed in 
teams operating on a full-time (though perhaps temporary) basis. By reducing the pool of 
customers who purchased radios via conventional shopping, direct sales thus restricted the 
16 
 
potential customer base for vendors not prepared to take on these costs. Moreover, authorised 
dealers for major radio brands had a competitive advantage in canvassing, as heavy 
manufacturer advertising boosted brand recognition and was often coordinated with dealers’ 
direct sales campaigns – increasing the likelihood that the salesman would receive a positive 
reception. Thus, by deterring market entry, canvassing may have been of greater benefit to 
the specialist radio retailer than was evident from its contribution to net margin. 
  
The depression, the ‘midget’, and the transformation of radio value chains 
  The depression and its aftermath witnessed a dramatic decline for the specialist radio 
retailer. Despite a rise in U.S. radio output from 4.44 million sets in 1929 to 6.03 million in 
1935, employment in the ‘household appliances, radio dealers’ Census classification had 
fallen by 34.8 per cent, to 71,971. Dollar sales by stores in this group had declined by 53.4 
per cent (compared with 32.2 per cent for all store sales), while the number of dealers had 
fallen by 26.3 per cent.xciv This was the product of technological changes that transformed 
radio from an expensive, bulky, product, requiring frequent servicing, to a cheaper portable 
appliance. 
A new compact radio format, known popularly and in the trade as the ‘Midget’, first 
appeared in California in 1929 and – as is often the case for new products that challenge 
incumbent formats - was initially produced by small start-ups that took advantage of the 
availability of cheap, externally-sourced, components.xcv Midget sets were essentially 
“market breakthroughs” – providing substantially higher customer value (for a segment of the 
market) using the industry’s established core technology, rather than “radical innovations” 
based on a substantially different technology.xcvi The first midgets were stripped-down 
versions of standard radios, in smaller cabinets. Miniaturised components were only 
introduced from 1932, by Emerson, though these were functionally identical to conventional 
parts (in contrast to later episodes of miniaturisation, such as the transistor, or microchip).  
During the 1920s large manufacturers had generally avoided price competition, 
relying on strong brands, based on quality, innovation, and promotion. The midget’s appeal 
was based on price, while performance initially did not meet accepted industry standards. 
However, as radio now provided all-day entertainment, with an increasing element of 
afternoon soap operas, sports, and other ‘talk’ content, purity of sound reproduction was 
becoming less important, especially for supplementary sets. Over the 1930s midgets 
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experienced dramatic improvements in quality – challenging conventional radios for a 
progressively larger segment of the market. 
These developments have strong parallels with the mobile phone industry, where 
economic recession at the beginning of this century depressed sales and triggered a shift in 
demand to low-price handsets. Marketing strategy thus shifted from quality and branding to 
aggressive pricing of entry-level phones, a sub-market where firms outside the established 
industry proved more successful than the market leaders.xcvii Those firms that became market 
leaders in small radios had been active in the industry prior to 1929, but not as major receiver 
manufacturers. Crucially, they typically had established distribution systems. For example, 
Philco (which tied for receiver market leadership, by volume, with RCA by the end of the 
1930s) was a long-established electrical goods producer, which had become a market leader 
in radio battery eliminators, but only entered receiver production in 1928 (capitalising on its 
formidable distribution network). Similarly Emerson, which became the largest specialist 
producer of small radios, had been selling radios since 1924, but as a dealer in surplus 
equipment rather than a manufacturer.xcviii Major retailers such Montgomery Ward and Sears 
Roebuck also took advantage of the shift from brand- to price-based competition, 
contracting-out the manufacture of sets sold under their own retail brands.xcix 
Despite lower prices, and profit margins, retailers welcomed the midget as something 
distinctive and novel in a depression market burdened by distress sales.c  Midgets offered the 
potential to draw in customers who either could not afford a conventional set, had small 
apartments, or wanted an additional receiver.ci Their contribution to total volume sales 
rapidly increased, reaching 60 per cent of all radios sold between 1st December 1932 and 1st 
May 1933.cii During the 1930s their weight and cost declined sharply (eventually retailing 
from under $10.00), while performance improved. An innovation initially widely viewed as a 
‘depression product’ dominated unit sales by the end of the decade.ciii  Midgets also took the 
lead in styling, appearing in distinctive modern cabinets, often using coloured Bakelite. 
Meanwhile the radio market was experiencing a general trend towards lower unit prices, as 
shown in Table 2. 
Midget radios undermined the quality-branding competitive advantages of the 
industry’s established leaders. Of the four leading set makers in 1929, three – Atwater Kent, 
Grigsby-Grunow, and Crosley - proved unable to weather this storm.civ Only RCA remained 
as a major player in radio manufacture, though this was largely due to its strengths in patents, 
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components production and, increasingly, broadcasting. Moreover, its market position had 
been strongest in the highest price classes of sets and it successfully held its lead in these 
segments during the 1930s.  
As a 1930 article noted, the midget appeared to have answered the radio retailer’s 
dream, ‘no deliveries, no financing, no collection grief, no service. “Just one long, sweet 
process of fittin’ em with tubes and passin’ em over the counter to eager buyers.”’cv Yet by 
reducing the need for home demonstration, delivery and servicing; credit; and showrooms 
worthy of a prestige piece of furniture; the midget eroded the key differentiating advantages 
of the specialist dealer. Moreover, as models had shelf lives of several years, rather than the 
annual model changes characteristic of conventional radios, the specialist retailer’s skills of 
managing rapidly depreciating inventory commanded less of a premium. By removing the 
need for the most troublesome aspects of the dealer’s activities, the midget had opened  up 
radio to the general retailer, who sold on price and did not require close co-operation with the 
manufacturer. 
Thus it was the weakness, rather than strength, of manufacturers’ control over dealers, 
that undermined their long-term survival. Established manufacturers proved powerless to 
block midget radios, in contrast to British set-makers, who supressed the format throughout 
the 1930s (via a black-list of non-conforming retailers - which was perfectly legal in the 
absence of any effective British anti-trust legislation).cvi In a depression market, specialist 
dealers had embraced what they believed to be a novelty and loss-leader, apparently unaware 
of the fundamental threat it posed to their business model. 
 
Conclusion 
 Like the refrigerator and washing machine, the radio of the early 1920s was an 
expensive mechanical novelty, requiring intensive advertising, considerable after-sales 
service, and costly door-to-door canvassing. By the late 1930s all three of these products had 
been largely transformed into ‘staple’ merchandise, increasingly marketed using standard 
retail channels and methods. However, while refrigerators and washing machines experienced 
this transition as an evolutionary process, with new innovations tending to reinforce the first 
mover advantages of the leading firms and their established distribution networks, in radio it 
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was marked by major disruptions to established industry structures and distribution 
channels.cvii 
  Interwar radio had more in common with modern high-tech durables such as mobile 
phones.  Development was characterised by rapid technological change, punctured by 
frequent `technological discontinuities’ – that made earlier vintages of radios obsolete  (for at 
least some market segments). Such patterns do not conform to classic Product Life Cycle 
models – where markets typically become increasingly dominated by early entrants, drawing 
on first mover advantages.cviii Michael Tushman and Philip Anderson distinguish between 
‘competence-enhancing’ technological discontinuities (building on existing know-how within 
a product class) and ‘competence-destroying’ technological discontinuities – new product 
sub-classes that require different skills and competitive strengths. The latter are typically 
launched by firms outside the established industry, leading to rapid changes in industry 
structure and posing severe problems for established leaders. cix 
During the 1920s discontinuities in radio technology were generally of the 
competence-enhancing type, involving new circuits or features that could be most rapidly 
exploited by existing market leaders.cx Conversely, the midget format constituted a 
competence-destroying discontinuity, competing on price, rather than quality. This posed a 
dilemma for market leaders with competencies based on quality, promotion, and branding. As 
predicted in the literature on technological discontinuities, this triggered both rapid firm entry 
and exit, with most leading manufacturers facing a rapid decline in market share, or 
liquidation. cxi 
 In common with more recent market breakthroughs, these changes had important 
implications for established relationships between manufacturers and their retailers.cxii 
Distribution networks based on co-operation failed to block the midget’s introduction, owing 
to manufacturers’ limited control over their dealers. Each typically stocked several brands of 
radio and faced no contractual restrictions on stocking this new format. Nor could informal 
pressure achieve this end, in an environment of sharply declining sales and prices. Yet by 
embracing the midget radio the specialist dealers popularised a format that required 
substantially less marketing, servicing, and instalment credit and thus undermined their 
barriers to entry. Radio thus represents an important precursor of the modern pattern of 
disruptive technological change in high-tech durables sectors, with even the strongest 
20 
 
manufacturers and distributors having to be forever vigilant for the next innovation that might 
threaten their competitive advantage. 
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Table 1: RCA's advertising expenditure as a percentage of sales, 1923-29 
Year Space Sales Promotion Co-operative Broadcast Total (%) Total ($)
1923 3.78 3.11 0.00 0.00 6.89 536,387      
1924 2.59 1.65 0.00 0.00 4.24 1,058,640   
1925 5.30 2.59 0.00 0.00 7.89 1,595,772   
1926 7.01 2.95 0.00 0.00 9.96 2,257,859   
1927 5.40 1.78 0.17 0.30 7.65 1,783,365   
1928 4.47 2.20 0.00 0.47 7.13 2,556,828   
1929 9.57 3.10 1.02 0.66 14.35 3,294,191   
Total 5.29 2.30 0.17 0.24 7.99 13,083,037  
Source: Data sheet on RCA advertising expenditure, n.d., c. 1930, RCA, Victor Division, 
Records of the Office of the Company Historian Series II, 2069/2/2, Hagley Museum 
Archives. 
Notes: Total sales figure for 1923 excludes tubes. Total sales for 1925 excludes $913,139 of 
component parts supplied to Brunswick and Victor, as attribution between firms not known. 
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Table 2: Sales of home radio apparatus in the United States (units and dollar values), 1922-34 
           Radio sets*       Radio tubes All equipment
Units 
(thousands)
Value      
($ million)
Unit 
Price
Units 
(thousands)
Value      
($ million)
Unit 
price
Value            
($ million)
1922 100.0 5 50 1.0 6.0 6 60.0
1923 250.0 15 60 4.5 17.0 4 136.0
1924 1,500.0 100 67 12.0 36.0 3 358.0
1925 2,000.0 165 83 20.0 48.0 2 430.0
1926 1,750.0 200 114 30.0 58.0 2 506.0
1927 1,350.0 169 125 41.2 67.3 2 425.6
1928 3,281.0 388 118 50.2 110.3 2 690.6
1929 4,438.0 592 133 69.0 172.5 3 842.5
1930 3,827.8 332 87 52.0 119.6 2 501.0
1931 3,420.0 212 62 53.5 69.6 1 309.3
1932 2,620.0 125 48 44.3 48.7 1 196.0
1933 3,806.0 131 34 55.6 56.6 1 212.0
1934 4,084.0 151 37 55.2 56.6 1 235.0
 
Source: Thomas Eoyang, “An Economic Study of the Radio Industry in the United States of 
America” (PhD thesis, Columbia University, 1936), pp. 73-85. Corrected using original data 
from, Radio Retailing (March 1933), 17-18;  (March 1932), 18-19; (March 1931), 20-21. 
Notes: Based on Radio Retailing data, shown at retail values. * Excludes cost of tubes.  
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Table 3: Determinants of net and gross profits (GLS estimates: n=100) 
                
  Gross profit     Net profit   
  Coefficent   z-stat   Coefficent z-stat 
log Publicity 0.247 *** (4.84)   0.348 ** (2.17) 
log Selling 0.344 *** (5.13)   0.135   (0.74) 
log 
Occupancy 0.309 *** (4.07)   0.226   (1.10) 
                
Constant 2.711 *** (7.72)   2.809 *** (4.53) 
                
Loglikelihood -32.55       -125.17     
  
      
 
    
                
Source: S. J. Ryan, “109 Radio Merchants Answer the Question – What of Selling Costs,” Radio 
Retailing (Sept. 1929), 52-4 & 92. 
 
Notes: ***p<0.01; **p<0.05. Coefficients are marginal effects. White corrected z-statistics in parentheses. 
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Figure 1: ‘Realizing the need’ via home canvassing and demonstration, as visualised by 
Radio Retailing in 1930 
 
Source: H. U. Mann, “Selling in the home multiplies desire,” Radio Retailing (May 1930), 
22-24, p. 22. 
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